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Working for Human Security:  
JICA’s Experience
Keiichi Tsunekawa and Ryutaro Murotani
Introduction
The concept of Human Security (HS) first appeared in Human Development 
Report (HDR) 1993 and HDR 1994 (UNDP 1993; UNDP 1994). The reports put 
forward the idea that people’s security should be guaranteed not only on a state 
level but also on an individual level.
The Japanese government adopted this idea in 1998 as a principle that should 
be taken into account in its Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy. It 
financed the establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security 
in 1999 and the Commission on Human Security in 2001. The final report of the 
commission in 2003, headed by Dr. Amartya Sen and Mme. Sadako Ogata, defined 
HS as guaranteeing the survival, livelihood, and dignity of all human beings. Fear 
(of armed conflict, crime, disease, natural disaster, etc.) and want (i.e., extreme 
poverty, unemployment, lack of food/water) are two major sources of human 
insecurity. The Japanese government revised its ODA Charter in August 2003 and 
included the principle of HS as one of its five basic policies.
JICA, as the most important ODA-implementing agency of the Japanese 
government, gradually introduced the HS concept into its activities after 1999. 
After Mme. Ogata became president of JICA in October 2003, the principle rapidly 
took root in the organization. In March 2004, HS was adopted as one of the three 
pillars of JICA’s Reform Plan.1 When the new JICA was formed in 2008 through a 
merger of the old JICA and the concession loan division of JBIC (Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation), HS was again chosen as one of the four missions of 
the organization (Toda 2009).2
JICA has not collected statistical data on how much of its budget has been 
allocated to increasing HS. It is impossible to do so because it is extremely difficult 
to separate HS components from other components in the same project/programs. 
1 The other two are “prioritizing the field” and “effectiveness, efficiency, and 
speed.”
2 The other three are “addressing the global agenda,” “reducing poverty through 
equitable growth,” and “improving governance” (JICA 2008).
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As a rough, representational indicator, however, the figure above shows Japan’s 
ODA spending in 43 countries that the OECD defined in 2010 as “fragile states.” 
Between 2003 and 2009, the share of Japanese ODA spending in these countries 
increased from 11.6 per cent to 24.4 per cent.3
Considering the growing importance of the HS agenda in Japan’s ODA 
policy, this chapter will examine the challenges and problems JICA has faced in 
its HS-oriented field operations. More specifically, it will analyze four cases—
Myanmar, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and Sudan—by focusing on the two 
major challenges: (1) possible contradictions between state security and human 
security and (2) special difficulties in the pursuit of comprehensive empowerment. 
Before going into the case studies, the following section will examine the process 
in which the Japanese government in general and JICA in particular adopted the 
HS principle. This will help clarify the nature of the two challenges mentioned 
above for Japan’s HS strategy.
3 Authors’ calculation of net ODA total (excluding debt relief) based on OECD 
Stat.
Fig. 10.1 Share of Fragile States in Japanese ODA
 (Net ODA Total, Excluding Debt Relief)
Source: Authors’ calculation based on OECD Stat.
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Working for Human Security 177
The Process of Mainstreaming Human Security in Japan’s ODA Policy
The government of Japan was one of the first governments to adopt HS as a 
principle of its foreign policy. It was then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi who 
first mentioned the concept in a speech he gave in Singapore in May 1998. His 
primary concern was to help Southeast Asian countries that had suddenly faced a 
serious socioeconomic crisis in 1997/98 (Fukushima 2010). The concept of HS 
was quickly integrated into the 1999 ODA Annual Report (JMFA 2000).4
However, the concept had not yet been clearly defined and widely shared 
among the various actors in Japan. For one thing, differing from Mr. Obuchi’s 
focus on socioeconomic insecurity, four of the five examples of HS issues 
listed in the Annual Report—the Kosovo War, anti-personnel mines, emergency 
assistance for relief and recovery from natural disasters, and countermeasures 
against drug abuse—were concerned not with social and economic development 
but with problems related to “freedom from fear.” Just one issue, women in 
development (WID), was less closely associated with “freedom from fear.” The 
same understanding of HS was apparent in the ODA Mid-Term Policy of Japan, 
which was announced in August 1999. In this document, human insecurity is 
treated as threats against individuals in the fields of environmental destruction, 
starvation, drug abuse, organized crime, infectious diseases, human rights 
infringements, regional conflicts, and antipersonnel mines (JMFA 1999). Most of 
these threats are related to “fear” rather than “want.” In the ODA Mid-Term Policy 
of Japan of 1999, “freedom from want” issues were treated under the banner of 
“human-centered development” separate from human security.
“Human-centered development,” a term equivalent to “human development,” 
had been most frequently used in the pre-1999 ODA Annual Reports to indicate the 
purpose of aid for basic livelihoods, education, and health. A report of the advisory 
Council on External Economic Cooperation submitted to Prime Minister Yoshiro 
Mori in September 2000 also recommended that “human-centered development” be 
the basic principle of Japan’s ODA policy. In this report, one section was dedicated 
to “Human Security and Economic Cooperation,” in which the authors called for 
active cooperation with NGOs across borders and emphasized the importance 
of conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance in violent-conflict situation, and 
post-conflict efforts for rehabilitation and reconstruction (JMFA 2001).
Apparently, HS was being treated as a new task to be added to the existing 
mission of “human-centered development.” This is partly because peace-building 
(including the prevention of the recurrence of violent conflicts) became a major 
mission for international society after a series of tragic experiences in Rwanda, the 
Balkans, and many other places around the world, to which the Japanese government 
felt an urgent need to respond in order to avoid the kind of embarrassment it faced 
4 ODA Annual Report was renamed into ODA White Paper in 2001.
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Post-Conflict Development in East Asia / Tsunekawa and Murotani178
in the wake of the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait in 1990.5 Consequently, the concept of 
HS came to be understood as being closely associated with conflict situation. It is 
not by chance that the ODA Mid-Term Policy of 1999 included conflict prevention 
and post-conflict reconstruction as one of seven priority tasks of Japan’s ODA 
policy.
However, a dilemma for Japan was the limitation it had with regard to the 
deployment of military forces abroad. Although the national Diet had passed a 
law (Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other 
Operations) in 1992 to allow the dispatch of Self Defense Forces overseas to 
participate in United Nations PKO missions, several conditions were imposed on 
the missions. For instance, the Japanese government has to secure the consensus 
of all stakeholders involved in the conflict before deciding to participate in the 
PKO mission. The dispatched troops have to take a neutral stance with respect to 
all stakeholders in the conflict. Furthermore, the use of arms is strictly limited to 
self-defense. Because of these limitations, SDF’s participation in PKO missions 
has been limited in frequency and small in scale. For this reason the Japanese 
contribution to peace-building faced limitations from the outset. It must be 
supported not by military means but mostly by non-military actions, of which 
ODA is a key component. The Japanese government naturally relied on ODA for 
the social and economic development that had occupied the central part of Japan’s 
overseas assistance under the banner of “human-centered development.”
Based on this understanding of HS, Japan took the initiative to create the 
United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security in March 1999. Then, at the United 
Nations Millennium Summit of Sept mber 2000, Prime Minister Mori declared 
that HS was a principle of Japan’s foreign policy and proposed the creation of a 
Commission on Human Security. This commission was subsequently established 
with Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen as co-chairs and published its final report in 
2003. 
This report helped to clarify relations among the three key concepts of Japan’s 
ODA policy: human-centered development, peace-building, and human security. 
First, by defining HS as “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear,” it integrated 
the first two concepts as similarly important missions to realize HS. Now, HS is 
not part of the human-centered development mission but the other way around.
Second, however, “freedom from want” and “human-centered development”, 
were not exactly the same. The Sen/Ogata report distinguishes HS from human 
development (“human-centered development” in Japan) by emphasizing the 
downside risks. Human development focuses on “expanding opportunities for 
people so that progress is fair” while “human security complements human 
development by deliberately focusing on ̒ downside risksʼ” (CHS 2003). This focus 
implies that HS considers not only people who are actually vulnerable, but also 
those who are potentially vulnerable. To prepare for these potential vulnerabilities, 
5 Although Japan contributed to as much as 13 billion US dollars to the anti-
Saddam Hussein campaign, it received scant international acknowledgment.
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Working for Human Security 179
reactive protective measures alone are not enough; proactive assistance to empower 
people is necessary. Furthermore, since insecurities can be caused by many factors 
(armed conflict, extreme poverty, natural disaster, pandemic diseases, etc.), the HS 
agenda will inevitably cover a broad range of actions.
In short, the HS principle now covered both the protection and emp werment 
of people in comprehensive issue areas, namely in both want and fear.
However, it took some time before this new understanding of HS was broadly 
accepted by stakeholders in Japan. In the new ODA Charter adopted by the 
Cabinet three months after the publication of Sen/Ogata report, HS was only 
briefly mentioned as one of the five basic principles of Japan’s ODA policy. The 
other four were support for self-help efforts, consideration of fairness, utilization 
of Japanese experience and expertise, and partnership and collaboration with the 
international community (JMFA 2003). 
The concept of HS as defined in the Sen/Ogata report was fully accepted by the 
Japanese government in the new ODA Mid-Term Policy announced by the Foreign 
Ministry in February 2005 (JMFA 2005). This document clearly stated that HS 
covers both freedom from want and freedom from fear and is concerned with both 
protection and empowerment. It further stated that HS was to be the principle that 
would lead activities in all four priority issue areas of Japan—poverty reduction, 
sustainable growth, global issues, and peace-building. 
In this way, HS covering comprehensive issues had become the most 
important principle of Japan’s ODA policy by the beginning of 2005. The 
Japanese government sought to pro ote this HS agenda internationally as 
well. Its main weapons were aid for socioeconomic development. By this time, 
however, Japan had been accumulating experience in post-conflict assistance, 
including DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) and/or post-
conflict reconstruction in Cambodia, Timor Leste, and Afghanistan and was ready 
to expand its activities in this area. Still, direct military involvement was not 
considered as part of the HS mission. Consequently, the Canadian initiative to 
connect HS with more punitive (eventually military) actions posed a difficulty for 
the Japanese government. 
In December 2001, the International Commission of Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), an advisory body to the United Nations established by the 
Canadian initiative, launched the concept of “the responsibility to protect (R2P).” 
It argued that the sovereign state has the responsibility to protect its own people, 
and therefore, if it does not have the will or capacity to do so, the international 
community can assume that responsibility. In extreme cases of human insecurity, 
even forceful intervention would be allowed (ICISS 2001). This interpretation of 
HS could not be easily accepted by the Japanese government. For a long time, the 
postwar Constitution of Japan had been interpreted as prohibiting the overseas 
use of military force. If Japan had actively endorsed the R2P doctrine, Tokyo 
feared, it would have faced strong criticism both domestically and among its Asian 
neighbors that it had changed its traditional policy. In addition to this concern, as 
Jun Honna (2012: 105) points out, the Japanese government feared that the R2P 
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Post-Conflict Development in East Asia / Tsunekawa and Murotani180
approach would undermine Japan’s diplomatic initiative to promote non-military 
HS approach. 
The Sen/Ogata report mentioned above admits “long-term conditions of 
oppression and deprivation” as one of the menaces against human security. 
However, it took the position that “human security reinforces state security but 
does not replace it” (CHS 2003: 5). The report avoided mention of the possibility 
of forceful intervention in a sovereign state. As a consequence, two interpretations 
of HS, Japanese and Canadian, coexisted.
When the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the World Summit 
Outcome in September 2005 (UNGA 2005), the R2P and HS were treated in 
separate paragraphs. Three paragraphs were devoted to the R2P, in which the 
Outcome declared that the international community should take “collective action, 
in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council,” if “national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” In the meantime, 
the paragraph devoted to HS simply confirmed the Sen/Ogata definition of HS 
as “freedom from fear and freedom from want” without mentioning the R2P. 
Similarly, the R2P paragraphs did not refer to HS at all. 
Nor did the January 2009 Report of the Secretary General on “Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect” mention HS. The term “human security” appears 
in only one paragraph (out of 72) referring to a “partnership between the 
intergovernmental body and a civil society network” in the Economic Community 
of West African States (United Nations 2009). 
This Secretary General report presented a three pillar strategy for advancing 
the R2P agenda. The primary responsibility goes to the sovereign state to protect 
its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. Pillar two is international assistance to a government that lacks the 
capacity to protect people from humanitarian disasters. Pillar three permits 
collective action by the UN member states when a state is manifestly failing to 
provide protection. The collective action ranges from pacific measures to coercive 
ones.
Clearly, pillar two of the above report partially coincides with the Japanese 
interpretation of HS. However, the HS agenda is much broader than pillar two 
of the R2P agenda. The HS mission includes both protection and empowerment 
in many issue areas ranging from extreme poverty, epidemics, sudden economic 
crises, natural disaster, and cross-border crimes to violent conflicts. The R2P 
mission, in contrast, mainly focuses on violent conflict situations in which extreme 
atrocities against human being can most likely be committed. 
The Japanese government apparently intends to continue promoting the 
HS agenda internationally by clearly separating HS from the R2P mission. In 
September 2012, Japan, together with twenty-four other countries, co-sponsored 
the draft resolution to follow up to the HS paragraph of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome (UNGA 2012). It reconfirms that HS is an approach to assist UN member 
states in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges 
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Working for Human Security 181
to survival, livelihood and dignity of their people. It also lists eight points as a 
“common understanding on the notion of human security.” Interestingly, fiv  of 
the eight points are dedicated to distinguishing HS from pillar three of the R2P. For 
instance, the fifth point states: “Human security does not entail the threat or the use 
of force or coercive measures. Human security does not replace State security.” 
In short, non-military assistance continues to be the means by which the 
Japanese government promotes the comprehensive HS agenda internationally. The 
Japanese approach to HS, however, has faced special challenges when it is put 
into practice in the actual field of ODA, and this is the subject of the next section.
Challenges in JICA’s Implementation of the Human Security Principle 
The first challenge is the potential contradiction between state security and HS. 
The HS principle dictates that Japan should assist people who are facing a survival 
crisis. If a recipient government willingly accepts the Japanese offer of assistance 
to enhance its physical and human capacity to improve the HS of its citizens, 
there will be no problem. The difficulty arises when certain governments are 
unwilling or reluctant to address human insecurity problems within their own 
borders. Since the Japanese government refuses to use force or the threat thereof, 
it needs alternative means to get access to the suffering people. The only possible 
means is to persuade the reluctant government to accept HS-oriented measures as 
neutral or nationwide programs, or as easures that can eventually contribute to 
strengthening state security. 
The second challenge stems from Japan’s highly comprehensive understanding 
of HS. The Sen/Ogata report emphasizes that the HS principle address the most 
vulnerable people in a society. However, as discussed above, it also distinguishes 
HS from the human development concept by focusing on the downside risks. In 
other words, the HS agenda includes not only the protection of actually vulnerable 
people but also the empowerment of potentially vulnerable people. In addition, it 
must cover many areas to secure both freedom from fear and freedom from want. 
In fact, since Mme. Ogata became president in October 2003, JICA has stepped 
up its efforts to quickly enter countries with HS crises to provide emergency aid 
and to transition smoothly from emergency humanitarian assistance (protection) 
to longer-term development assistance (empowerment). Measures for protection 
are visible in the sense that one can assess results relatively easily by looking 
at people’s physical conditions. In contrast, the mission of comprehensive 
empowerment poses a difficult problem because it is hard to assess the long-term 
effects of individual projects or programs on people’s capacity to overcome broad 
downside risks. This difficulty has become more notable recently as demand for 
evaluations of the effectiveness of ODA activities is increasing both domestically 
and internationally. 
Considering these challenges to the HS principle, this section will analyze 
JICA’s HS-oriented activities by focusing on two issues: (1) How JICA has dealt 
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Post-Conflict Development in East Asia / Tsunekawa and Murotani182
with the potential contradiction between state and human security; and (2) How 
JICA has sought to empower people to prepare for broad potential risks. Four 
conflict-ridden countries (Myanmar, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and Sudan) 
in which JICA has been active were chosen as case studies, since conflict-prone 
countries most frequently face a contradiction between the two securities and feel 
the need to comprehensively empower people to be free from both fear and want. 
The Case of Myanmar
Although HS had not yet been integrated into Japan’s ODA policy, one early case 
of a project that was eventually HS-oriented is JICA’s alternative development 
assistance to the North Shan State of Myanmar. The North Shan State, on the 
Chinese border, was formerly a major poppy-producing area. It is inhabited by 
minority ethnic groups, some of whom were engaged in armed conflict with 
the central government, at least until the 1989 ceasefire agreement was signed 
between the rebel forces in the Kokang region and the military government. In the 
1990s, indigent villagers continued to rely on poppy production and smuggling 
for their livelihoods. The military government, known as the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC), which had annulled the 1990 general election and 
faced international sanctions, feared the intrusion of foreign personnel into these 
politically sensitive minority regions.6
Japan was among the first countries to recognize the military government 
after the 1988 coup. However, it continued to conform to the US and European 
policy of imposing international sanc ions on Myanmar by suspending new ODA 
provisions. Japanese support was limited only to those projects that were already 
underway and humanitarian/emergency aid (Koppel and Orr 1993: 151). In the 
meanwhile, the Japanese govern ent continued its attempt to persuade the SLORC 
government to start moving toward democratization. On one such occasion, in 
1993, Koichi Kato, an influential leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), met First Secretary Khin Kyunt, the third most important leader of 
SLORC and the head of the Work Committee for the Development of Border 
Areas and National Races of Myanmar. This committee had been organized in 
1989 to promote economic development in the border areas to placate minority 
ethnic groups. At that meeting, First Secretary Khin Kyunt complained about 
the difficulty in eradicating poppy production in border areas due to the lack of 
alternative products. Subsequently, Kato consulted with Tomomitsu Iwakura, an 
agricultural policy specialist from the LDP, about the possibility of introducing 
Soba (buckwheat) into the cool hill regions of Myanmar. Iwakura in turn spoke 
to the president of the Japan Association of Noodle Businesses and secured a 
commitment to purchase Burmese buckwheat (Araki 2012; “Drug control and 
Japan” website; ADPEA website). 
6 Descriptions in this subsection are based on information obtained from JICA 
Knowledge Site: Myanmar, JICA (2009), and Umezaki (2007) unless otherwise indicated.
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Working for Human Security 183
In 1995, when the Myanmar government softened its stance toward the 
opposition and released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the Japanese 
government announced its intention to reopen its ODA to Myanmar to support 
Basic Human Needs projects (Sugishita 1999: 402–404). In this context, I akura 
visited Khin Kyunt with a personal letter from Kato in 1996 (“Drug control and 
Japan” website). The Myanmar government finally agreed to start a project to 
introduce buckwheat into the Kokang region of North Shan State. This process 
shows how the Japanese government took advantage of personal relations between 
Japanese and Burmese politicians and persuaded the Myanmar government, using 
a combination of carrot and stick, so that the latter accepted a Japanese project in 
a conflict-affected region. 
The buckwheat project began in 1998, before Japan’s adoption of the HS 
principle, by dispatching JICA experts in its production. JICA test-cultivated 
buckwheat, trained villagers, provided them with seeds and fertilizer, and helped 
export their product to Japan. Exports began in 1999 and reached the peak of 90 
tons in 2003. 
In practice, however, the alternative development project in the Kokang region 
was facing difficulties by 2002, as the buckwheat produced in the region was unable 
to meet the quality or price demands of the Japanese market. In the meantime, 
the Myanmar government had reinforced its policy of forcibly eradicating poppy 
fields, depriving villagers of what was still an important source of income. As a 
result, indigent villagers faced a serious HS crisis in 2003. More than 100 people 
starved to death while 4,000 people were infected with malaria and 270 died of 
the disease. JICA launched emergency aid in 2004, but to avoid duplication with 
the assistance offered by the World Food Programme (WFP) and international 
NGOs, it avoided the direct provision of food and medical services and provided 
the villagers with seeds, fertilizer, and mosquito nets. JICA also reconstructed a 
main road in the Kokang region to facilitate emergency aid activities.
In tandem with this emergency aid, JICA started a long-term Comprehensive 
Village Development project in 2005, in which JICA experts engaged in 
participatory developm nt activities for basic health and education, kaizen 
(improvement of everyday life), and agricultural production, including alternative 
development. To JICA’s regret, military clashes recurred in the Kokang region in 
August 2009 and JICA experts were forced to leave the region. The programs were 
sustained by the Burmese counterparts but inevitably on a smaller scale. 
The Myanmar case indicates that the Japanese government maintained relations 
with high-level officials in the military government and attempted to persuade them 
to democratize the regime and to accept Japanese aid for conflict-affected regions. 
It was an exasperatingly time-consuming process. Furthermore, the buckwheat 
project that finally got underway in 1998 focused on only one agricultural product 
and consequently faced serious difficulties when the product was found to be 
unable to replace poppy as a better source of income for the villagers. On the basis 
of these initial stumbles, JICA designed a more comprehensive HS project in 2005, 
covering broader agricultural sectors as well as education and health activities. 
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It also took the empowerment approach by involving villagers in the planning and 
implementation of various projects. Unfortunately, the activities had to be scaled 
back with the relapse of military clashes. 
At present, thanks to a substantial, if not full, democratization of the Myanmar 
regime and the cease-fire agreements, JICA expected to step up its activities in 
the region. It will, however, be a long time before JICA can start evaluating its 
empowerment activities in the Kokang region.
The Case of the Philippines
Mindanao is one of the poorest and most conflict-ridden regions in the Philippines. 
Even after the conclusion of the 1996 peace agreement between the Philippine 
government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), another Muslim 
group called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continued to fight the 
government, with intermittent cease-fires and peace negotiations.7
The Japanese government offered its Filipino counterpart aids for social and 
economic development in the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao so that people 
under the influence of MNLF could enjoy a peace dividend, thus contributing to 
the consolidation of peace in the region. The Estrada government was reluctant 
but the following Arroyo government sought Japanese assistance positively. 
Subsequently, the Japanese government launched a “Support Package for Peace 
and Stability in Mindanao” in 2002. This “package” was primarily planned for 
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) governed by MNLF and 
comprised measures such as human resource development and improvement of 
administrative capabilities for the ARMM government, the design of development 
plans for local business promotion and road construction, the provision of 
agricultural extension services, and community infrastructure development. This 
last, which was supported by a large concession loan from JBIC, aimed at involving 
villagers in the planning and implementation of local infrastructure projects to 
build schools, health centers, portable water supply facilities, and roads. These 
measures aim at long-term empowerment rather than short-term protection. 
In the meanwhile, the Arroyo government and MILF concluded a framework 
agreement for the resumption of peace talks in 2001, but the subsequent 
negotiation for a final peace agreement was slow. The Japanese government, 
with the conviction that efforts for restoration and development would help peace 
talks and reconciliation, offered providing assistances for MILF-influenced areas. 
This proposal was accepted by both the Arroyo government and the Bansamoro 
Development Agency (BDA) of MILF. As a consequence, in 2006, the Japanese 
Embassy expanded grassroots grant assistance programs to the areas, and the 
JICA started a community development project similar to that in the ARMM in 
the following year. This project, together with previous projects in Mindanao 
7 Descriptions in this subsection are based on information obtained from JICA 
Knowledge Site: the Philippines unless otherwise indicated.
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Working for Human Security 185
(including ARMM), was labeled as one comprehensive program called the Japan-
Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD). This was 
a rare case of Japan entering a conflict-affected region before a peace agreement 
was reached. The Japanese government took this initiative because it believed 
that it was trusted by both the Arroyo government and MILF as a religi usly and 
culturally neutral force. 
In 2006, Japan joined the International Monitoring Team (IMT) that had 
been established in 2004 to monitor the implementation of the 2003 cease-fire 
agreement between the Philippine government and MILF. Japan dispatched an 
expert in socioeconomic development to join the international team. A Supreme 
Court order on the land issue in Mindanao led to a recurrence of military 
clashes in 2008, but when the peace negotiations restarted, a new group called 
the International Contact Group (ICG) was organized to attend and observe the 
negotiations and ensure the implementation of mutually agreed agreements. Japan 
was once again invited to be a member. In addition, the Japanese government 
mediated the first-ever meeting between the President of the Philippines (Benigno 
Aquino III) and the top leader of the MILF (Chairman Murad Ibrahim), which was 
held in August 2011 at a hotel near the Narita International Airport. In October 
2012, a framework agreement for peace was signed between the peace panels of 
both sides, in which they committed themselves to peaceful transition toward the 
enlargement of the Muslim autonomous region and the possible renaming of the 
region to a Bangsamoro region.
In short, the contradiction between state security and human security was minor 
in the Philippines because the Arroyo government and the Aquino government, 
if not the Estrada government, were positive in accepting external assistance 
for the socioeconomic development of the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao 
in the belief that improving living conditions could soften armed resistance by 
MILF. This position of the Philippine government coincided with the expectation 
of the Japanese government that actual projects/programs for socioeconomic 
development should help facilitate peace negotiations. Japanese assistance for 
Mindanao can therefore be regarded as a typical example of an external actor 
assisting a sovereign state whose capacity, not necessarily its will, is insufficient 
to guarantee people’s HS. 
As for the c mprehensive-empowerment aspect of the HS, J-BIRD is 
certainly a comprehensive endeavor, including community development projects, 
agricultural extension, and administrative capacity building for planning, rule-
making, and implementation. Unfortunately, given its short history it is impossible 
for now to make any assessment of its impact on people’s capacity to cope with 
various downside risks. However, it should be noted that the HS-oriented activities 
enhanced opportunities for the contending parties to meet frequently and learn 
about each other. To achieve meaningful results for the residents, officials from 
the central and local governments on the one hand and officials from MILF’s 
B sngsamoro Development Agency (BDA) were compelled to work together, 
hich led to their eventually developing confidence in one another. In this sense, 
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Japanese aid for socioeconomic development has contributed to peace-building in 
Mindanao, thus removing one of the major downside risks.
The Case of Afghanistan
Afghanistan was one of the largest recipients of Japanese ODA for the last ten 
years. JICA started by supplying emergency aid, but quickly moved to implement a 
broad range of initiatives in the areas of health, education, agricultural production, 
vocational training, urban planning, and many other sectors. In addition, most of 
these JICA projects feature the element of empowerment.8
At the beginning, it was expected that the Taliban forces would be gradually 
removed from the country by US and NATO’s military action, as well as through 
socioeconomic development supported by foreign aid. In this context, state 
security and HS were complementary as the Afghan government itself eagerly 
sought foreign aid. As in the Philippines, Japanese ODA aimed to improve the 
Afghan government’s capacity to enhance the HS of its people. 
JICA’s activities in Afghanistan have been very comprehensive in that they have 
encompassed the reconstruction and strengthening of the National Tuberculosis 
Institute (NTI), vocational training, reconstruction and maintenance of the rice-
production extension center at Jalalabad, preparation of manuals for school 
teachers, reconstruction of the international airport and inter-state roads, and the 
DDR of ex-combatants. In most of the projects, the participatory method was used 
to empower Afghan officials, educational and medical staff, workers, and farmers. 
The best example of JICA’s comprehensive-empowerment approach, 
however, is the community development project called the Inter-Communal Rural 
Development Project (IRDP), which was implemented in Bamiyan, Kandahar, 
and Balkh Provinces from 2005 to 2010. This project shares a similar participatory 
approach with those in Kok ng and Mindanao, but differed in its clustering 
method. Building on the successful National Solidarity Programme (NSP), JICA 
and the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) 
attempted to group three to six communities together to implement cluster-wide 
public works such as the construction of inter-village roads, drinking water supply 
networks, irrigation dams, and micro-hydro power plants. Villagers were required 
to participate in the planning and implementation of these construction works in 
order to obtain block grants.
The dual motives of the IRDP were first to improve villagers’ living conditions 
and second to strengthen MRRD’s capacity to reach people. For the first purpose, 
IRDP attempted to complement the NSP as the latter was confined to individual 
isolated villages and consequently had limited effectiveness for infrastructure 
projects covering broad areas like those mentioned above. As for the second 
8 Descriptions in this subsection are based on information obtained from JICA 
Knowledge Site: Afghanistan and JICA Research Institute (2012) unless otherwise 
indicated.
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Working for Human Security 187
purpose, it is important to remember that no official administrative structure existed 
below the provincial level when the new government was organized in 2002. The 
NSP was an attempt to construct a village-level planning and implementation 
mechanism (called CDC, or Community Development Council) and associate 
it with the central government. The IRDP was an attempt to complement the 
CDC-central government connection by creating an intermediary (Cluster CDC) 
between the villages and the central government. The IRDP thus attempted to 
empower both villagers and the government to implement a range of projects that 
would help improve people’s HS. 
In some regions, the IRDP reportedly contributed to improving HS by building 
confidence among once antagonistic villages and by strengthening people’s 
resilience to natural disasters. One good example is the Sheberto region of the 
Bamiyan Province where the Cluster CDC planned and constructed a reservoir. 
The process of planning and implementation opened up opportunities for dialogue 
and collaboration among communities that had once been in violent conflict with 
each other. This reservoir also relieved the villages of the HS risk stemming from 
drought. 
As the IRDP was regarded as highly successful, the method of CDC clustering 
was adopted by the NSP as part of its second phase program in 2008. Now the NSP 
would take on the cluster CDC program at the Bamiyan, Nangarhar, and Balkh 
Provinces by using the World Bank Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) 
(World Bank website). The NSP also cooperated with JICA experts to edit the 
Annex for the NSP manual to be used for its cluster program. 
The cluster program is new. It started in 2005 and was scaled up only in 2008. 
In addition, the application of the approach is still confined to three provinces. 
Although there are some indications (such as the case of the reservoir in Sherberto) 
that the approach has contributed to the improvement of HS, more time is needed 
before we can start assessing the full potential of the program. 
A further concern is the worsening of security in Taliban-affected areas. 
JICA’s activities have been adversely affected as indicated by the withdrawal of 
its Japanese personnel from Kandahar in April 2006. The Afghan case indicates 
a limitation of the non-military approach in a country where some of the 
stakeholders are committed to violent methods and continue to threaten HS. The 
Japanese government has assisted the Afghan government by sharing the cost of 
maintaining the police force but does not provide aid to strengthen its military 
capability. Hopefully, visible improvements in living conditions in the regions 
where JICA is working can have demonstration effects for Taliban-affected areas 
and help to weaken violent resistance, as has happened in Mindanao.
The Case of Sudan
In Sudan, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was reached between the 
government and the Southern anti-government movements in January 2005. 
However, the situation was so precarious that the potential contradiction between 
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state security and human security was as great as in Myanmar. To reach vulnerable 
people, JICA needed to persuade the unenthusiastic Khartoum government to 
accept Japan’s ODA activities in the South. To do that, JICA proved its neutrality 
to the government by offering assistance to both North and South in an equal and 
balanced manner. In fact, the same number of trainees were chosen from North 
and South so that they could attend JICA-arranged training courses for water 
supply management (in Ethiopia), science education/nursing/HIV (in Kenya), and 
hospital management (in Egypt) after 2006.9
Later, however, in the face of the grave HS crisis in the South, JICA concentrated 
its efforts on the South, while its efforts in North Sudan were delayed. Sensing 
the frustrations from the Khartoum government, in 2008 JICA renewed its efforts 
in North Sudan in the areas of maternal and child health care, rice production, 
and the training of personnel for water-supply stations. JICA also organized a 
training program in March 2011 (before the independence of South Sudan) for 
customs officers in Mombasa, inviting officers from both North and South Sudan 
to participate.
Even in Darfur, JICA opted to work with, not ag inst, the Sudanese government 
to reach people in a HS crisis. Together with the federal and state governments, 
JICA designed a training program for midwifery trainers and instructors on well 
reconstruction, woodwork, electrical instrument and car repairs in 2008. JICA’s 
policy has been to stay as close as possible to vulnerable people to implement HS 
projects.
The nature of Japan’s assistance to South Sudan in the early post-CPA period 
was primarily for the protection of the suffering people. It provided financial 
resources to international organizations for emergency humanitarian purposes such 
as food provision, treatment of infectious diseases in children, and the repatriation 
of externally and internally displaced persons. 
In parallel with these protection-oriented assistances, JICA started to plan 
more empowerment-oriented projects. The construction of the Juba river port was 
one early example. Construction started in September 2006 and was completed 
in one year. The port was vital to connecting South Sudan with the North and 
the outside world. It was basic infrastructure based on which South Sudan would 
consolidate its political and economic life as a new state. Another example of 
an empowerment-oriented project was the rehabilitation and expansion of a 
vocational training school for local residents and ex-combatants. JICA not only 
provided the necessary instruments and materials but also trained instructors at the 
school. The training courses included construction work, car repairs, woodwork, 
welding, electrical work, and secretarial work. The courses began in 2007, training 
2,430 people over the subsequent three years and four months. It is reported that 
71 per cent of the graduates successfully found employment. 
9 Descriptions in this subsection are based on information obtained from JICA 
Knowledge Site: Sudan; JICA Knowledge Site: South Sudan; and Shishido (forthcoming) 
unless otherwise indicated.
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Working for Human Security 189
In addition to these activities, JICA has implemented, among others, a 
livelihood improvement project near Juba City, the training of primary-school 
science/math teachers, hospital management, and the construction of a nurse 
and midwife training school. In all of these projects, JICA attempted to involve 
relevant officials from the state governments and from the central government 
(the provisional autonomous Government of Southern Sudan until July 2011 and 
the Government of the Republic of South Sudan thereafter). Many of the projects 
have had the clear purpose of empowering local people and government officials 
to nurture and strengthen their ability to improve HS conditions in the new nation.
However, although Japan sharply expanded grant aid and tec nical-cooperation 
assistance to Sudan, from 2.11 million US dollars in 2005 to 42.72 million dollars 
in 2006 and to 109.64 million dollars in 2008 (OECD.Stat), this was still too 
small to satisfy even the basic humanitarian needs of South Sudan because the 
aid needed to be shared by North and South Sudan and the latter started from 
extremely low living standards. There is a long way to go to evaluate the long-term 
effects of JICA projects for the empowerment of the people and the government 
of South Sudan.
The Sudanese case also demonstrates a limitation of the Japanese non-military 
approach to HS. As with the Afghan situation, eruptions of violence in various 
regions of South Sudan have impeded the scaling-up of socioeconomic development 
measures. In contrast to the case in Afghanistan, Japan decided to participate in the 
United Nations PKO Mission in South Sudan and began dispatching SDF troops 
there in January 2012. However, the number of troops is limited (no more than 
370 soldiers are stationed in South Sudan) and their primary mission is to engage 
in construction work under the command of the United Nations Mission in the 
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Although the SDF is cooperating with JICA 
and the Foreign Ministry of Japan in some construction work, their mission is not 
to serve as a fighting force to assure security at the project sites.
In short, JICA took the same approach of persuasion in Sudan as it did in 
Myanmar to get access to vulnerable people whose HS was in a grave danger. In 
Sudan, it attempted to balance its activities in North and South, thus benefiting 
both in an equal manner. However, peace between North and South has not yet 
been consolidated, hich forces JICA to continue its precarious balancing and 
persuasion strategy to enhance its projects for socioeconomic development in 
South Sudan. The process is inevitably slow. Comprehensive empowerment, one 
of the major objectives of Japan’s HS strategy, is only a long-term possibility.
Conclusion
In its international promotion of the HS agenda, the Japanese government has 
clearly separated HS from the R2P agenda, which permits the exercise of force 
in the cases of extreme atrocities against humans. For the Japanese government, 
the improvement of HS should reinforce state security and, therefore, no military 
© Copyrighted Material
© Copyrighted Material
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  
Post-Conflict Development in East Asia / Tsunekawa and Murotani190
action would be necessary to implement HS-oriented projects. JICA accepted 
this interpretation of the HS agenda and expected that concrete socioeconomic 
measures would reduce antagonisms among contending forces and eventually 
contribute to solving armed conflict, one of the major sources of human insecurity, 
while simultaneously improving state security.
Among our case countries, the Philippines has offered the only case in which 
the Japanese expectation appears to be realized. The J-BIRD progr m, together 
with the Japanese government’s involvement in the peace process, has seemingly 
contributed to confidence building between the Philippine government and the 
MILF. This success, however, is partially thanks to the positive behavior of the 
Philippine government in accepting JICA’s offers to supplement its insufficient 
capacity to achieve the socioeconomic development of Mindanao. This positive 
behavior on the part of the Philippine government helped the active involvement of 
JICA, which in turn helped nurture more cordial relations between the contending 
forces. 
This kind of virtuous circle has not yet been observed in the other three 
countries. On the contrary, the recurrence of violent clashes has impeded the 
scaling-up or expansion of socioeconomic projects. In Afghanistan, although the 
government was ready to accept external assistance, the Taliban has persisted in 
its violence and has rejected foreign aid. In Myanmar and Sudan, the governments 
were not enthusiastic about foreign aid activities in the conflict-affected regions 
but were persuaded to accept them. However, government forces and minority-
group rebels have fought intermittently until recently in Myanmar. In Sudan, the 
independence of the South has failed to alleviate military tension in the border 
regions. In these countries, long and persistent efforts will be needed to achieve 
JICA’s aim to promote peace through non-military socioeconomic projects.
As for the comprehensive-empowerment aspect of the HS agenda, the concept 
of empowerment has posed no problem to JICA since self-help and human 
resource development have always been the basic principles of Japan’s ODA 
policy. In JICA’s experience, providing security solely through the provision 
of physical goods/facilities and social services has only been observed in the 
early post-conflict phase of humanitarian aid. In all four countries studied in this 
chapter, initiatives that attempt to empower individuals, communities, and public 
organizations for sustained development have been the most prominent aspect of 
JICA’s activities.
The comprehensiveness of the HS agenda, which is regarded as necessary for 
people to be prepared for various downside risks, has created more challenges 
for JICA. In all four countries examined in this chapter, JICA has attempted to 
be comprehensive in its project and program designs. However, compared with 
the formidable tasks these conflict-affected countries face in protecting and 
empowering their people, JICA’s resources are limited. JICA cannot yet claim that 
its activities have been effective in comprehensively empowering these countries. 
Considering its limited resources, JICA will need to enhance its current 
policy of cooperating and coordinating with other international, bilateral, and 
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Working for Human Security 191
non-governmental actors in order to promote the comprehensive-empowerment 
agenda. To do so, however, JICA and these actors will need to share a common 
understanding of the HS agenda. Shaping this understanding is another major 
challenge for JICA.
The HS approach became mainstream in Japan only in the mid-2000s. JICA’s 
effort to improve HS of actually and potentially vulnerable people have just begun. 
It will need to persevere in the years to come.
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